



INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Visit of Afghan commander [REDACTED]

The following reviews comments by [REDACTED] main commander in the province of [REDACTED] during his visit with Dr. Ikle and during a subsequent conversation with me.

[REDACTED] claims to have, aside from his predominant role in the [REDACTED] region, some 42 other "fronts". The areas in which he has people he listed as: [REDACTED] Politically he is aligned with the [REDACTED]

Military situation.

[REDACTED] presented a generally gloomy picture of the military situation, accentuated further by his lack of adequate weaponry and ammunition. He described the Soviets as putting a great deal (and increasing) of pressure upon the Mujahidin. He said that Soviet helicopters bomb even at night when lights are visible on the ground. Soviets shoot at anything that moves in the fields, they burn crops and otherwise try to force people to leave Afghanistan. According to [REDACTED] the Soviets realize that people who remain to work the land are the only support for the Mujahidin. [REDACTED] claimed that so far he had been able to prevent people in his areas from leaving in significant numbers.

To a question about possible further Soviet efforts to cut off supply routes to Pakistan, [REDACTED] replied that the Soviets had tried before and had failed and would fail again. There are so many passes, he stated, that this is an impossible task.

[REDACTED] maintained, in response to a question, that he has no problem in transitting through areas held by other commanders. Iranian assistance to the Mujahidin according to him is minimal and confined to the Hazara people in central Afghanistan.

Weapons and training

[REDACTED] made an urgent plea for weapons, saying he has no anti-aircraft weaponry (not even Soviet), lacks ammunition, mine-detectors, communication equipment, etc. . He also expressed a desire for effective training.

He stated having essentially captured AK47s, five-shot rifles,

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some anti-tank rocket-launchers (300-500 meters range), Dashaka heavy machine guns. He has a limited number of mines.

[redacted] apparently spoke up against the lack of effectiveness in transmitting weapons and had his supply virtually cut off. According to his account jealousy on the part of the Peshawar Afghans because of his popularity inside the country contributed to their going to the Pakistanis and having the flow stopped.

According to him some of the Peshawar leaders are [redacted]

Food and medical situation

[redacted] asserted that he has no medical assistance to speak of -- no doctors or medicines in his areas. Soviet destruction of irrigation networks and burning of crops has created a very serious situation.

He said that we could give food in kind, to be distributed to the Afghans through the Pakistanis or through some other agency of our choosing, and/or give cash to commanders.

Political organization and cooperation

[redacted] differentiated as others have done between the situation inside Afghanistan and that in Peshawar. In the former he asserted that there is a great deal of coordination and cooperation. The latter he seemed to view essentially as a hindrance and source of corruption.

He outlined two ways in which greater cooperation and organization could be achieved. These two he did not see as mutually exclusive. 1) Get the various commanders together into some sort of organization or common grouping, 2) give the former king a role as a unifying factor. [redacted] described Zaher Shah as having a great deal of support among fighting Afghans and among the refugees, and as having little support from the leaders of the parties in Peshawar. (Note: It is the moderate alliance [redacted] that has been pushing for a popular assembly as well as for some role for the king. They would be unlikely to push for something like that unless they were fairly sure about the popularity of the former king.)

[redacted] bottom line was that aid should come through a single source. Everyone would then have to go to that source and unity (in the Afghan sense) would result.

Elie
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The following frames correspond to documents which were acquired after the publication had gone to press. As a service to researchers, the documents are included here. They are ordered by the document number assigned to them since it was not possible to integrate them chronologically into the microfiche.